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Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) are 
an important public health concern. Since the emer-
gence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) 
during the 1980s and its link with human Creutzfeldt–
Jakob disease, active surveillance has been a key ele-
ment of the European Union’s TSE control strategy. 
Success of this strategy means that now, very few 
cases are detected compared with the number of ani-
mals tested. Refining surveillance strategies would 
enable resources to be redirected towards other pub-
lic health priorities. Cost-effectiveness analysis was 
performed on several alternative strategies involving 
reducing the number of animals tested for BSE and 
scrapie in Great Britain and, for scrapie, varying the 
ratio of sheep sampled in the abattoir to fallen stock 
(which died on the farm). The most cost-effective strat-
egy modelled for BSE involved reducing the proportion 
of fallen stock tested from 100% to 75%, producing a 
cost saving of ca GBP 700,000 per annum. If 50% of 
fallen stock were tested, a saving of ca GBP 1.4 million 
per annum could be achieved. However, these reduc-
tions are predicted to increase the period before sur-
veillance can detect an outbreak. For scrapie, reducing 
the proportion of abattoir samples was the most cost-
effective strategy modelled, with limited impact on 
surveillance effectiveness.
Introduction
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a prion 
disease of cattle, first identified in 1986 in Great 
Britain (GB) (GB refers to England, Wales and Scotland, 
whereas the United Kingdom (UK) also includes 
Northern Ireland. This study was based on GB-level 
data, however some of the data referred to were 
recorded at UK level). The epidemic in GB reached its 
peak in 1992 with ca 37,000 BSE cases [1], evolving into 
a public health crisis when it was linked to a human neu-
rodegenerative condition, variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob 
disease (vCJD), in 1996. To date, a total of 229 deaths 
from vCJD have been recorded, of which 177 were in the 
UK [2,3]. However, a recent UK survey of human appen-
dix tissue indicated that 493 (95% confidence interval 
(CI): 282–801) per million people are asymptomatic 
carriers of the abnormal vCJD prion [4]. Control meas-
ures and trade restrictions imposed during the BSE epi-
demic resulted in devastating economic consequences 
for the British beef industry. 
Scrapie is a prion disease that has been present in the 
sheep population in GB for several hundred years [5]. 
While there is no evidence linking scrapie to disease in 
humans, there have been concerns in the past that a 
scrapie outbreak could mask a hypothetical emergence 
of BSE in sheep. In addition, recent experimental stud-
ies using primate and humanised mouse models have 
indicated a zoonotic potential [6,7]. Cases of atypical 
scrapie and BSE have been detected in recent years, 
and their aetiologies remain unclear [1,8]. Atypical BSE 
occurs very rarely (only 10 cases have been detected 
to date in GB), while atypical scrapie appears to be 
endemic in GB.
A number of measures aimed at the eradication of 
these transmissible spongiform encephalopathies 
(TSEs) have been successful in that the incidence of 
both BSE and scrapie has fallen consistently in GB and 
across the European Union (EU) in recent years [1]. In 
order to determine the trend of TSE prevalence over 
time in EU Member States (MS), active surveillance is 
in place. This involves the testing for BSE in all EU MS 
of all cattle older than 48 months (24 months in some 
MS) which are either emergency-slaughtered for ani-
mal welfare reasons such as injury or illness or fallen 
stock which have died on the farm. Testing of healthy 
cattle slaughtered for human consumption was ceased 
in 2013 with certain exceptions (Bulgaria, Croatia and 
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Romania) for the EU-25 [9]. Passive surveillance is also 
carried out via the notification of suspect clinical cases 
by veterinary surgeons. For scrapie, active surveillance, 
in the form of an annual survey of both fallen stock 
and healthy slaughtered animals, was added in 2001 
and started in 2002 for all EU MS to the compulsory 
notification of suspect clinical cases, to monitor the 
incidence in sheep and the impact of disease control 
measures [10]. The presence of atypical disease forms 
is also monitored as a by-product of active surveillance, 
but this is not its primary aim. In recent years, the ratio 
of detected cases over the number of animals tested 
for both BSE and scrapie has been very low. In 2014 for 
example, ca 115,000 cattle were tested for BSE in GB, 
and just one case was detected [1]. There is therefore 
an economic incentive to re-evaluate current active 
surveillance systems to ensure that the resources 
deployed remain proportionate to the risk presented by 
a very low TSE prevalence. The re-allocation of funding 
could enable resources to be more effectively targeted 
at other diseases or issues, with beneficial outcomes 
for food safety. However, it is important that GB and 
the EU continue to have robust evidence to respond in 
a timely way to threats from new or re-emerging TSEs.
Previous studies have been conducted to evaluate BSE 
surveillance [11,12]. Most recently, to aid the deter-
mination of the level of sampling required, a model 
commissioned by the EU [13] demonstrated that a sur-
veillance system based on the testing of at-risk animals 
(emergency slaughter, fallen stock and animals show-
ing clinical signs) would be sufficient to detect a BSE 
case at a minimum prevalence of 1 in 100,000 in the 
standing population, with 95% confidence. However, 
this model was not able to explore the ability of such 
a surveillance system to detect re-emergence of birth 
cohort-based increases in BSE. For scrapie, models 
have focused on the estimation of prevalence of ani-
mals or holdings from surveillance data [14-16], rather 
than exploring the optimal design of a surveillance 
scheme.
The potential public health impact of TSEs and result-
ing political concern are important considerations 
in the formulation of surveillance strategies, and in 
situations where state or EU legislation apply, the 
research should be framed within this context. Animal 
health scientists have historically tended to focus on 
technical aspects of disease control without consider-
ation of economic and socio-political impact [17]. Cost-
effectiveness analysis allows the consideration of the 
financial value of a change, framed by a measure of the 
impact that change may have on society. The aim of the 
present study was to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of 
alternative surveillance strategies for BSE and scrapie, 
while explicitly considering the policy implications of 
these changes.
Methods
The approach taken was firstly to simulate a number 
of BSE and scrapie surveillance scenarios and esti-
mate the time taken to detect a statistically significant 
increasing trend in prevalence. Secondly, the total cost 
of surveillance between the start of the hypothetical 
increase and detection was calculated for each sce-
nario. Thirdly, a number of measures for the technical 
assessment of surveillance were included in a cost-
effectiveness analysis of the alternative scenarios. 
Finally, a number of interviews were conducted with 
policy experts and key stakeholders to discuss the 
results and the future of TSE surveillance. Each of 
these steps is described below in greater detail.
Estimating time to detect significant increasing 
trend
The estimate of the prevalence in each birth cohort 
(BSE) or calendar year (scrapie) was obtained by 
means of the back-calculation approach used in 
Arnold and Wilesmith for BSE, and Arnold and Ortiz-
Pelaez for scrapie [11,14]. Information on population 
size, test sensitivity and numbers tested, along with 
the assumed trend of infection each year, was used to 
generate the number of expected and the number of 
observed cases each year in GB for each surveillance 
activity. Variability was determined by Poisson distri-
bution, which was used to simulate the observed num-
ber of cases from the expected values.
Figure 1
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ICER: incremental cost effectiveness ratio.
ICERs with a positive value can fall within either quadrant 1 or 3. 
Surveillance scenarios in quadrant 1 can be acceptable in terms of 
cost-effectiveness, if they are within a threshold of acceptability 
(to be defined by policymakers). Scenarios with ICER values in 
quadrant 3 are likely to be unsuitable for policy objectives. A 
negative ICER value could indicate either the most desirable result 
(quadrant 2), or an undesirable outcome (quadrant 4), hence care 
should be taken in interpretation.
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Figure 2
Incremental cost effectiveness ratios for alternative surveillance strategies for bovine spongiform encephalopathy, Great 
Britain
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ICER: incremental cost effectiveness ratio.
Blue dots: strategies where 75% of fallen stock are tested; orange dots: strategies where 50% of fallen stock are tested. The spread of points 
indicates the range, i.e. the uncertainty associated with the ICER, and is derived from 1,000 iterations of the model. For clarity, only scenarios 
involving the highest and the lowest starting point and rate of increase in prevalence are displayed (i.e. scenarios 2, 3, 17 and 18).
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To estimate the time of detection, a model of the form 
Aexp(Bt) was used (where A represents the infection 
prevalence at the start of the re-emergence, B repre-
sents the annual rate of increase, and exp denotes 
exponential growth), fitted to the infection prevalence 
in each birth cohort (BSE) or calendar year (scrapie), 
from the time when the prevalence started to increase. 
The first time point at which the rate of increase was 
statistically significant was recorded. The model was 
run 100 times for each scenario.
The scenarios to be modelled were defined during a 
stakeholder workshop involving policymakers from the 
Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra), the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) 
and the Food Standards Agency (FSA), UK government 
bodies which are concerned with food safety and/or 
livestock health. Scenarios modelled for BSE involved:
• i) the proportion of fallen stock tested: 100% (base-
line), 75% and 50%
• ii) the hypothetical rate of increase in birth cohort 
prevalence: 40%, 20% and 10%
• iii) the age of cattle tested: > 48 months (base-
line), > 60 months and > 72 months
• iv) the starting point: 2006 (relatively high preva-
lence) and 2013 (very low prevalence)
For scrapie, scenarios were based on:
• i) the annual number of sheep tested: 20,000 (base-
line), 15,000, 10,000 and 5,000
• ii) the ratio of abattoir survey sheep versus fallen 
stock sheep tested: 33:76 (baseline), 100:0, 75:25, 
25:75 and 0:100
• iii) the hypothetical annual increase in standing pop-
ulation prevalence: 10% and 5%
At the same workshop, parameters to measure the 
technical effectiveness of surveillance were also 
decided by policy stakeholders. These were:
• i the time to detection of an increasing trend in 
prevalence
• ii) the number of infected animals (and sheep hold-
ings for scrapie) in the standing population at the 
time of detection
Figure 3
Incremental cost effectiveness ratio values for alternative 
scrapie surveillance scenarios, in relation to the number of 
years until detection of an increasing trend, Great Britain
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Figure 4
Distributions of incremental cost effectiveness ratio values 
for alternative scrapie surveillance scenarios, in relation to 
the number of years until detection of an increasing trend, 
Great Britain
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• iii) the number of infected animals presented at 
slaughter during the period from the start of the 
increasing trend to detection.
Costing of core surveillance activities
The costs of TSE surveillance were considered from a 
public sector perspective. The approach was to calcu-
late the variable cost of testing one fallen stock cow, 
one fallen stock sheep or one abattoir sheep in GB, 
taking into account the following surveillance activi-
ties: The cost of rapid testing (all animals), including: 
(i) sampling and administration costs at the sampling 
site, (ii) consumables for sampling, (iii) sending of 
samples by courier from the sampling site to the labo-
ratory, and (iv) rapid testing at the laboratory. In the 
case of a positive or equivocal result on the rapid test, 
in addition: (i) transportation from the laboratory to the 
APHA and (ii) confirmatory testing. Fixed costs (such 
as sample archiving) were assumed not to change with 
respect to the number of animals tested and thus were 
not included in the analysis.
Estimating cost-effectiveness
The costs of each surveillance scenario were obtained 
by stochastic simulation using @RISK 6 software [18]. 
The unit cost of testing one animal was multiplied by 
the number of animals tested per year and the num-
ber of years until detection of a statistically significant 
increasing trend in prevalence. To account for variabil-
ity, a normal distribution was applied to the number 
of years until detection, using the mean and stand-
ard deviation (SD) values generated from the simula-
tion model. There was variability in the cost of sample 
transportation, and this was incorporated into the 
model as a normal distribution using the mean and SD 
of quotes from several different couriers. The predicted 
number of detected cases, as well as the number of 
false-positive or equivocal results expected based on 
the specificity of the rapid test, were used to calculate 
the cost of confirmatory testing during the period. The 
simulation was run for 1,000 iterations. As costs over 
time were linear, the cost per annum was derived from 
the cumulative cost of each scenario.
The number of infected animals in the standing pop-
ulation at the time of detection was calculated using 
the simulated prevalence of infection at the time of 
detection and the most recent available UK cattle and 
sheep population data (from 2013) [19]. The number 
Table 1
Simulated technical outcomes (including 95% confidence intervals) and costs of scenarios for the surveillance of bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy, Great Britain
Scenario Starting point
Rate of annual 
increase in 
prevalence (%)
% fallen stock tested 
(> 48 months)
Years until 
detection of 
an increase 
in prevalence
Infected animals 
presented 
at slaughter 
during period 
to detection
Infected animals 
in UK standing 
population at time 
of detection
Mean 
annual cost 
in million 
GBP
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
1 2006 40 100 7.61 (+/- 1.76) 111 (+/- 59) 260 (+/- 152) 2.86
2 2006 40 75 8.07 (+/- 1.79) 131 (+/- 80) 305 (+/- 194) 2.15
3 2006 40 50 8.68 (+/- 2.32) 162 (+/-126) 385 (+/- 305) 1.43
4 2006 20 100 8.37 (+/- 2.13) 67 (+/- 25) 74 (+/- 16) 2.87
5 2006 20 75 8.37 (+/- 2.39) 85 (+/ - 43) 126 (+/- 56) 2.14
6 2006 20 50 9.62 (+/- 3.14) 112 (+/- 71) 160 (+/- 92) 1.44
7 2006 10 100 8.36 (+/- 2.16) 66 (+/- 25) 74 (+/- 15) 2.86
8 2006 10 75 9.12 (+/- 2.85) 77 (+/- 36) 79 (+/- 22) 2.14
9 2006 10 50 10.57 (+/- 4.92) 95(+/- 67) 89 (+/- 33) 1.42
10 2013 40 100 14.97 (+/- 3.21) 88 (+/- 61) 70 (+/- 25) 2.87
11 2013 40 75 21.09 (+/ - 2.77) 116 (+/ -74) 64 (+/ - 2) 2.14
12 2013 40 50 22.40 (+/ - 2.62) 166 (+/ - 122) 53 (+/ - 27) 1.43
13 2013 20 100 21.35 (+/ - 3.61) 71 (+/ - 36) 66 (+/ - 44) 2.85
14 2013 20 75 22.76 (+/ - 3.57) 86 (+/ - 44) 86 (+/ - 58) 2.14
15 2013 20 50 26.09 (+/ - 3.92) 137 (+/ -78) 159 (+/ -103) 1.43
16 2013 10 100 32.42 (+/ - 9.25) 74 (+/ - 47) 39 (+/ - 32) 2.85
17 2013 10 75 36.59 (+/ - 5.72) 104 (+/ - 21) 55 (+/ - 30) 2.14
18 2013 10 50 42.23 (+/ - 5.25) 147 (+/ - 68) 93 (+/ - 47) 1.43
19 2006 40 100% > 60 months 8.58 (+/ -2.06) 153 (+/ - 103) 366 (+/ - 249) 2.43
20 2006 40 100% > 72 months 10.15 (+/ - 2.24) 261 (+/ - 189) 623 (+/ - 449) 2.03
SD: standard deviation; UK: United Kingdom.
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of infected sheep holdings in the standing population 
was estimated using UK data from 2010 [20].
In order to compare the cost-effectiveness of different 
surveillance scenarios, incremental cost effectiveness 
ratios (ICERs) were calculated as per Formula 1.
where C = cost; O = outcome; a = alternative surveil-
lance scenario and b = baseline scenario. 
This provided an explicit expression of the difference 
in cost of an alternative scenario compared with the 
baseline, taking into account the difference in techni-
cal outcomes [21]. Using negative cost in this equa-
tion means that this ICER is a measure of money saved 
rather than money spent. ICER results are displayed in 
plots of costs saved against technical outcomes. Figure 
1 shows a key to interpretation of ICER plots.
Policy perspective
Finally, cost-effectiveness results were presented to 
policy stakeholders during a second workshop and 
telephone and email interviews were conducted with 
15 experts in TSE science and policy from Defra, APHA, 
FSA, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the 
European Commission, and higher education and 
research institutions. These semi-structured inter-
views explored stakeholders’ views on the purpose 
and future direction of surveillance, and the political 
landscape including trade and the public.
Results
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Table 1 summarises the simulation results for each 
scenario.
Reducing the proportion of fallen stock tested resulted 
in considerable reductions in the annual cost of surveil-
lance. However, it also had an impact on the effective-
ness of surveillance, increasing the number of years 
until detection of an increasing trend in prevalence, the 
number of infected animals in the standing population 
at the time of detection and the number of infected ani-
mals presented at slaughter before detection (Table 1). 
The magnitude of this effect varied depending on the 
starting point and the rate of hypothetical increase in 
prevalence.
The ICER plots in Figure 2 show the distribution of the 
simulation results, derived from 1,000 iterations of 
Table 2
Costs and simulated technical outcomes (including 95% confidence intervals) of various surveillance scenarios for classical 
scrapie, Great Britain
Abattoir survey and fallen stock 
sampling scheme Years to detection
Mean no. 
of infected 
animals 
presented 
at slaughter 
before 
detection
Mean no. 
of infected 
animals in 
standing 
population at 
detection
Mean no. 
of infected 
holdings 
at time of 
detection
Mean 
annual 
cost in 
GBPScenario
Total 
no. of 
animals 
tested 
per year
AS:FS 
ratio Mean (SD)
10% annual rate 
of increase in 
prevalence
Baseline 20,000 33:67 11.19 (+/− 6.17) 2,100 29,411 712 565,637
1 15,000 33:67 11.68 (+/− 7.30) 2,311 31,674 748 423,309
2 10,000 33:67 12.58 (+/− 7.59) 2,631 36,198 819 285,738
3 5,000 33:67 14.07 (+/− 8.61) 3,278 40,723 961 141,932
4 20,000 100:0 11.73 (+/− 6.62) 2,266 31,674 748 793,899
5 20,000 75:25 11.16 (+/− 7.22) 2,122 31,674 748 705,796
6 20,000 25:75 10.41(+/− 6.90) 1,914 29,411 641 546,633
7 20,000 0:100 10.84 (+/− 6.48) 2,029 29,411 677 466,698
5% annual rate 
of increase in 
prevalence
Baseline 20,000 33:67 16.18 (+/− 12.73) 2,594 22,624 534 568,968
1 15,000 33:67 17.19 (+/− 14.14) 2,875 24,886 570 425,387
2 10,000 33:67 17.74 (+/− 15.55) 3,082 24,886 570 282,690
3 5,000 33:67 23.23 (+/− 17.32) 4,719 33,936 783 141,369
4 20,000 100:0 15.98 (+/− 12.23) 2,501 22,624 534 798,568
5 20,000 75:25 17.13 (+/− 11.74) 2,744 24,886 534 709,465
6 20,000 25:75 15.98 (+/ − 12.38) 2,532 22,624 534 546,842
7 20,000 0:100 16.06 (+/− 10.00) 2,494 22,624 499 460,393
AS: abattoir survey; FS: fallen stock; SD: standard deviation.
Formula 1
ICER =
−(Ca−Cb)
/ 1,000
 (Oa−Ob)
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the model. These plots demonstrated that strategies 
testing 75% or 50% of fallen stock may be considered 
acceptable in terms of cost-effectiveness, as their 
distributions fell mainly within quadrant 1. Strategies 
where 50% of fallen stock are tested provided a mean 
cost saving of GBP 1.43 million per annum, around 
twice the cost saving of strategies testing 75% of fallen 
stock (mean cost saving GBP 716,000 per annum). The 
distribution of values shown in Figure 2 reflects inher-
ent variability and uncertainty in both the costs and 
technical outcomes, which were taken into account in 
the model.
Mean ICER values for 75% and 50% testing strate-
gies were, respectively: GBP 667,000 and 628,000 
(saved per additional year to detection), GBP 40,000 
and 28,000 (saved per additional infected animal pre-
sented at slaughter during the period to detection), and 
GBP 20,000 and 14,000 (saved per additional infected 
animal in the standing population at detection). The 
lower ICER values indicated that 50% testing strategies 
are less cost-effective in terms of every technical out-
come modelled. However, given the establishment of a 
threshold of acceptability (as per Figure 1) they could 
potentially still be considered acceptable in terms of 
cost-effectiveness, and therefore adopted into policy, 
which would enable considerable cost savings.
Increasing the age at which fallen stock animals are 
tested performed less favourably than reducing the 
proportion of fallen stock tested in terms of cost-effec-
tiveness (Table 1).
Scrapie
Reducing the total number of sheep tested without 
changing the ratio of abattoir survey to fallen stock 
(i.e. scenarios 1–3 in Table 2) increased the time to 
detection of an increasing trend of scrapie prevalence 
by between 4.4% and 25.7%, or between 6.2% and 
43.6% at a 10% or 5% rate of increase in prevalence, 
respectively (Table 2), along with similar proportion-
ate increases in the number of infected animals and 
the number of infected holdings in the population at 
detection.
When the mean model outputs for these strategies were 
plotted, they all fell within quadrant 1 (Figure 3), indi-
cating that they can be considered to be cost-effective 
relative to the baseline depending on the threshold of 
acceptability. The mean ICERs for one of the technical 
outcomes (the number of years to detection) are shown 
in Figure 3 as an example. Figure 4 demonstrates the 
variation associated with these mean values, showing 
the distribution of results of multiple iterations of the 
model.
Table 2 shows that changing the proportion of abattoir 
survey animals to fallen stock (scenarios 4–7) had a 
small influence on the mean number of years to detec-
tion as well as the other technical outcomes, but had a 
considerable impact on cost. The mean ICER values for 
all three technical outcomes (an example is shown in 
Figure 3) indicate that strategies which involve reduc-
ing the proportion of sheep tested in the abattoir survey 
(strategies 6 and 7) were the most cost-effective of all 
strategies modelled, as they were all located within the 
second (most desirable) and first quadrants. However, 
the distribution of simulation results for one of the 
technical outcomes – the number of years to detection 
(Figure 4) – shows that there are a large range of pos-
sible outcomes (note the difference in scale between 
Figures 3 and 4), some of which fall into the third quad-
rant. Outcomes in the third quadrant are not desirable 
in the context of the policy question addressed by the 
present study.
For all scenarios, the starting prevalence in animals 
was 0.00044 (ca 7,400 infected sheep), so there was a 
three- to four-fold increase in the prevalence in animals 
at detection depending on the scenario. The preva-
lence of infected flocks before the increasing trend was 
0.0064 (ca 460 flocks), so there was a 2.8- to 3.6-fold 
increase in the prevalence of infected flocks at detec-
tion, depending on the scenario.
A reduction in the rate of prevalence increase from 10% 
to 5% across scenarios caused an increase in the mean 
time to detection (Table 2). However, the final preva-
lence of infected sheep and holdings was on average 
lower for the 5% increase per annum compared with 
the 10% increase.
Policy
Some of the 15 experts who were interviewed were 
cautious about the idea of reducing BSE and scrapie 
surveillance, expressing that active surveillance plays 
a role in building trust with other countries in order to 
strengthen trade. Nonetheless, there were indications 
of some interest in a change in active surveillance. 
It is most likely that a reduction in BSE surveillance 
would be considered only if and when the UK achieves 
‘negligible risk’ status by EU and World Organisation 
for Animal Health (OIE) standards. There were mixed 
views among experts as to what would be the poten-
tial impact on trade (if any) of reducing scrapie sur-
veillance, and there is already some policy support for 
changing the ratio of sheep tested in favour of fallen 
stock.
Discussion
Surveillance for BSE across the EU has been evaluated 
in terms of its ability to detect a test-positive animal at 
a minimum prevalence of 1 in 100,000 in the standing 
population with 95% confidence [22], and on this basis 
recommendations were made that healthy slaughtered 
cattle no longer need to be tested. While the calcula-
tions were rigorous, the choice of the target minimum 
prevalence is debatable and represents a balance 
between having a robust surveillance system and 
what is practical in terms of cost. Our study builds on 
this work firstly by providing a more thorough evalu-
ation of the ability of a surveillance system to detect 
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re-emergence, and secondly by linking the surveillance 
measures to cost. While this study uses data from GB, 
the model could easily be applied to data from other 
European countries in future analyses.
The model for BSE surveillance is dependent on 
assumptions regarding the age of onset, which was 
estimated using data from the original BSE outbreak 
[23] but could feasibly have changed in more recent 
cases. Analysis of animals born after the reinforced 
feed ban (BARBs) in GB (in July 1996) has shown that 
the age of onset has not changed significantly for 
BARBs compared with animals born before the total 
feed ban [24], although there are few BSE-infected 
BARB animals (150 in GB) compared with pre-BARB 
BSE cases (approximately 180,000 in GB). A lengthen-
ing of the incubation period, for example because of 
a lower average infectious dose, would make the time 
to detection longer than that predicted in the present 
study, although the incubation period is not sensitive 
to small changes in dose [25].
The approach for modelling scrapie surveillance was 
based on assumptions of an annual increase in scra-
pie prevalence in the standing population, whereas the 
approach used for BSE in this study was based on an 
increase in successive birth cohorts. For scrapie, esti-
mation of prevalence in birth cohorts is problematic 
because the age of the tested animals is not recorded. 
The present model only considered an increase in the 
prevalence of classical scrapie, as that was deemed 
of much greater relevance to policy than an increase 
in atypical scrapie. The model framework developed in 
the present study could be adapted for use for atypical 
scrapie, although there are likely to be difficulties in 
estimating some of the necessary parameters, particu-
larly the sensitivity of the rapid test. We found that if 
the proportion of sheep tested in the abattoir stream 
were reduced, there would be a reduction in the cost 
of surveillance while maintaining technical outcomes. 
However, EU approval would currently be required for 
such a change.
In addition to modelling the technical outcomes, the 
present study also links these with costs in the form 
of the ICER. The costs of each scenario were calculated 
for the hypothetical outbreak period only (i.e. from the 
start of an increasing trend in prevalence until detec-
tion), even though surveillance is continuous, as this 
enabled comparison between scenarios. It is useful for 
policymakers to identify a threshold of acceptability for 
ICERs. Standardised ICER thresholds are established 
in human healthcare settings [26,27] and help policy-
makers to decide upon whether a proposed scheme is 
appropriately cost-effective or not. In this case, policy-
makers would need to consider at what point a compro-
mise in technical effectiveness becomes unacceptable, 
and whether this varies according to costs saved.
A considerable proportion of the simulation results for 
scrapie were located in the third quadrant, in which 
technical outcomes are improved given an increase in 
costs. This is a result of random variation, arising from 
the variability and uncertainty incorporated into the 
model. Outcomes in the third quadrant may technically 
be considered cost-effective but are not desirable from 
a policy perspective, given that the objective of the 
present study was to explore ways to reduce the cost 
of surveillance. This highlights that the mean ICER val-
ues should be carefully considered within the context 
of the range of possible outcomes.
Before active surveillance was implemented, passive 
surveillance was useful for detecting BSE cases during 
the early stages of the epidemic in the UK. However, 
since the decline in BSE cases, passive surveillance 
has become less useful, as it depends greatly on the 
vigilance of farmers and veterinarians and their ability 
to recognise clinical signs, which will naturally decline 
with increasing time since an epidemic. It could be 
hypothesised that in the future, active surveillance 
may eventually be replaced with a different approach, 
for example risk-based surveillance, but such a change 
would still need to be consistent with the regulatory 
framework.
TSE surveillance is part of a package of control meas-
ures, including the restricted feed ban which prohibits 
feeding mammalian meat and bone meal to livestock 
and the removal of specified risk material in abattoirs 
[28]. Consumers would continue to be protected by 
these controls regardless of any change in surveillance 
strategy.
Two of the TSE experts interviewed suggested to raise 
the age of fallen stock tested for BSE from the current 
48 months. However, the present study found this to 
be a considerably less cost-effective strategy than 
reducing the proportion of fallen stock tested. This 
highlights the value of studies such as this to provide 
a robust basis on which experts can form opinions. 
Ultimately, a strong base of scientific evidence should 
underpin any future changes to TSE policy.
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